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Research · 5 min read

Researchers reset the TPM’s wrong-PIN counter to guess Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs in days

TU Berlin’s “Hello Again” attack needs the laptop in hand, the case open and custom hardware. It found a 4-digit Hello PIN and a 6-digit BitLocker PIN in the lab. Longer PINs help most.

BBy Brody · FramePublished November 19, 2026
A processor chip icon in a red circle inside dotted rings, with small PIN field and padlock icons around it, on a dark background.

Windows Hello lets you unlock a PC with a short PIN, sometimes just four digits. That is only safe because a chip called the TPM (Trusted Platform Module) limits how many wrong guesses you get before it locks. BitLocker’s startup PIN relies on the same lockout. Researchers at Technische Universität Berlin have now shown that, on some PCs, someone with the laptop in hand can reset that wrong-guess counter and keep guessing.

Their paper, “Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs”, was posted on November 13, 2026. AMD and Intel published responses on November 16 and 17, and The Hacker News covered it on November 18.

This is a physical attack. It does not work over the internet or through an app. It matters most if your laptop could be stolen or left alone with someone who knows what they’re doing.

How the attack works

Most modern PCs use a firmware TPM built into the processor rather than a separate chip. A firmware TPM has no secure storage of its own, so it saves its state, including the count of wrong guesses, encrypted on the mainboard’s flash chip. If someone copies that saved state and later writes the old copy back, the count goes back too.

Newer PCs try to stop that with RPMC (Replay Protected Monotonic Counters), counters inside the flash chip that can only go up. The researchers found two ways around them:

  • AMD: the processor’s firmware never checks that a counter actually went up. A small board placed between the processor and the flash chip can block the update and report success.
  • Winbond flash chips: a brief drop in the chip’s power (a “voltage glitch”) makes it reveal the secret key that signs its counter values. With that key, the board can forge any count. Winbond is the largest maker of this kind of flash, with more than 25% of the market, according to the paper.

On two AMD desktops without RPMC flash, the researchers say simply writing an old copy back with an ordinary flash programmer reset the count, with no special board needed.

What they demonstrated

The researchers separate what they showed from what they believe. What they demonstrated, on locked, encrypted laptops, with PINs they had set themselves:

  • Windows Hello on an AMD laptop (HP OmniBook 3, Ryzen AI 5 330): their setup typed PINs from 1000 upward and found 1235 after 236 tries in 57 minutes.
  • BitLocker on an Intel laptop (Framework Laptop 13, Core Ultra 5 125H, Winbond flash): it found 123457 after 236 tries in 6 minutes and 55 seconds.

In both tests they removed the flash chip and wired in their own board, and slowed the link to the flash chip in firmware settings so their board could keep up. From the speeds they measured, they calculate these worst cases:

PIN lengthWith the default lockout (one try back every 10 minutes)Hello attack (AMD laptop)BitLocker attack (Intel laptop)
4 digits69 days40 hours5 hours (only if an admin allows 4 digits)
6 digits19 years168 days20 days
8 digits1,903 years46 years6 years

The lockout column assumes Microsoft’s documented default, which gives back one try every 10 minutes. On the laptops they tested, the researchers saw a two-hour recovery time instead, so a working lockout would be slower still.

What they claim but didn’t test

  • Either method could be used against either kind of PIN.
  • A recovered Hello PIN can also unlock keys tied to the device, enable Hello-based single sign-on at work, and in some setups pass a multi-factor check.
  • The AMD flaw likely affects AMD PCs that use Microsoft’s Pluton security chip as their TPM.

The researchers say reproducing the attacks “is not plug-and-play” and needs one of their boards, which they have published along with the firmware and scripts on GitHub. Neither the paper nor the vendor notices describe any attack outside the lab.

What the vendors say

  • AMD published bulletin AMD-SB-7079 for CVE-2026-43613 (CVSS 5.1). It says physical attacks are outside its threat model, but “RPMC is intended to stop this type of interposer attack,” and it plans firmware fixes on target dates from November 2026 to February 2027 across Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon and EPYC chips. These are planned dates for AMD’s firmware, not updates already shipping for your PC. Until then, AMD recommends keeping systems under physical control and watching for tampering.
  • Intel said in a security announcement that the research “did not demonstrate a vulnerability in an Intel component,” and advised customers to ask their PC maker about updates. That matches the tests: the Intel laptop attack relied on the Winbond chip’s weakness.
  • Microsoft, according to the paper, rated the Hello report as moderate and below its bar for an immediate fix, and committed to raising its recommended minimum Hello PIN length to six digits.
  • Winbond, the researchers say, is studying the issue but has not committed to a fix or a date.

What you can do

  1. Make your Windows Hello PIN longer. Two extra digits change the worst case from hours or days to months or years in the researchers’ figures. Letters and symbols help even more. You can change it under Settings, Accounts, Sign-in options, PIN.
  2. If you use a BitLocker startup PIN, use more than the default six digits. Admins can raise the “Configure minimum PIN length for startup” policy and turn on “Allow enhanced PINs for startup” to allow letters and symbols.
  3. On an AMD PC, install the firmware (BIOS/UEFI) update from your PC maker once it includes AMD’s fix.
  4. Keep your laptop with you when travelling, and treat signs of tampering, like loose screws or a case that has been opened, as a reason to talk to IT.
  5. For admins: raise the Windows Hello for Business “Minimum PIN length” policy. If it isn’t set, Windows requires six digits, which the researchers estimate at 168 days worst case on the AMD laptop.

Sources

  • Werling, Finder, Jacob, Prein, Kühnapfel and Seifert (TU Berlin), Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs, arXiv, November 13, 2026
  • AMD, AMD-SB-7079 security bulletin, November 2026
  • Intel, Hello Again security announcement, November 16, 2026
  • Researchers’ code and board designs, rpmc_attacks on GitHub
  • The Hacker News, New Attack Bypasses TPM Lockout to Crack Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs in Days, Not Years, November 18, 2026
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