Scams · 3 min read
A fake Teams booking page turned a device code into a stolen session
Huntress says a construction employee approved a Microsoft device-code sign-in that was presented as a meeting reference. The code was typed on Microsoft’s real page.

A page that looks like a Microsoft Teams scheduler can be asking you to approve someone else’s sign-in. Help Net Security reported on November 13, 2026 that attackers used that lure on an employee at a construction company. Huntress’s security operations center caught it after the person had already approved a device-code login. The attacker had a valid session token.
How the booking page worked
Device-code sign-in is a real Microsoft flow, meant for a TV or a device that cannot show a normal login. The attacker starts that flow, receives a short code, and has to get the victim to type the code on Microsoft’s own device-login page. If the person does, and completes a second factor when asked, Microsoft issues tokens to the session the attacker started.
In this case the email impersonated a senior vice president at another construction firm, from a lookalike domain. The link was a Google share link, so the attacker’s domain was not in the message itself and reputation checks on the mail had less to see. The page showed the executive’s photo and offered an introductory call about a supply partnership. Continue started a device-code request. The next screen labeled the code a “Booking Reference,” with a countdown. Copy or confirm put the code on the clipboard and opened Microsoft’s real sign-in. After a successful login, the page said verification was complete and sent the person to a Calendly page.
Help Net Security, citing Huntress, says the kit was built so a scanner that does not run JavaScript sees an encrypted blob, and so a second-factor error starts a fresh code instead of stopping. The final login was sent through a residential proxy in New Orleans so it looked like ordinary traffic.
This is a different campaign from the fake AI-event pages we wrote about on November 5, which also abused a device code. The lure here is a supplier meeting, not a prize.
What you can do
- Do not type a device code that a website just showed you. Microsoft’s page is real. The trick is that you did not start the login. If you are not signing in on a TV or a phone that asked you for a code, close it.
- A countdown and a “booking reference” are pressure, not proof. A real Teams invite does not need you to paste a code into a Microsoft login that a stranger opened.
- If you already entered one, tell the administrator, sign the work account out of other sessions, and look for a new second-factor method, an unknown device, an app you did not approve, and mailbox rules you did not create. Huntress’s list is that set.
- Administrators who do not use device-code sign-in can restrict it. A sign-in whose program name is a script runner, in an interactive log, is worth a look. Phishing-resistant factors, such as a passkey, are what Huntress recommends where a code can still be approved by mistake.
How Frame helps
Frame can also look up your verified emails in Have I Been Pwned’s breach database. This attack steals a session token. It is not a published list of addresses, and Frame does not see the prompt inside the browser.
Related coverage
- Fake OpenAI and SpaceX event pages are phishing Microsoft and Google work accounts: an earlier device-code campaign with a different lure.
- Fake Microsoft 365 notices told people their held mail would be deleted: another Microsoft-themed phish from the same week, using a real outage number.
Sources
- Help Net Security, How attackers turned a Teams meeting booking into a device code phishing trap, November 13, 2026, citing Huntress
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