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Malware · 6 min read

Optimizely says a flaw let an attacker plant malware on customer websites

Report URI found the code on snippets for 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC and CNN. It swapped wallet addresses, skimmed some card fields and targeted older iPhones.

BBy Brody · FramePublished November 17, 2026
The Optimizely logo on a light card, joined by a dotted arrow to a dark green tile with a bug icon, on a dark background.

On November 16, 2026, visitors to sites run by at least 178 organizations loaded malicious JavaScript that had been written into Optimizely, the experimentation product those sites already trusted. Scott Helme at Report URI published the finding that evening. Optimizely later confirmed it. Its status page says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and that the company has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected user accounts, and added protections so unauthorized code is not delivered. The incident was still marked monitoring early on November 17.

A spokesperson told Gizmodo that the vulnerability was in the Experimentation account signup flow, that affected customers have been notified, and that Optimizely blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix. The company has not said how a signup-flow flaw became write access across unrelated customer projects.

What visitors received

Optimizely Web has each customer load a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely’s network. The snippet holds Optimizely’s code, the customer’s experiments, and an optional field called Project JavaScript, which is custom code the customer writes and which runs on every page. Helme says the attacker wrote a loader into that field and left the rest of the snippet alone. The file was still served from Optimizely’s address, with Optimizely’s certificate. He says this was not a case of poisoning a cached copy on the delivery network. Optimizely’s own sites, www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, carried the code too. Some customers serve the same snippet from their own domain. Those were affected as well, because the content comes from the same project.

Helme’s team checked 1,611 snippets and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. The names he lists include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. He says the real number is likely higher, because the check only covered snippets the team could find in time. BleepingComputer confirmed the loader on scans of a number of those sites.

The loader pulled in a script Helme calls track.js. He describes three versions: a plain script address, the same address hidden so a search for the domain would miss it, and a full copy of the payload inside the snippet for the case where the remote script was blocked. Smartsheet’s snippet, he writes, was cleaned and then infected again with the hidden version, which he reads as the attacker still having access at that moment.

What the script did

Every visitor who received track.js got the same script. What it did depended on the device and on what the person did on the page. Helme’s account, which StepSecurity reviewed against the payload, describes four jobs running at once:

  • Wallet addresses. The script looked for real cryptocurrency addresses and replaced them with the attacker’s, including on the page, in the clipboard, and in some outgoing requests. Helme says it checked the address so it would only swap a real one. Copying an address on an affected page, or copying one elsewhere while that tab stayed open, could paste the attacker’s address instead.
  • Card fields. A skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC. It watched forms and some requests for a card number, an expiry date and a security code, and tried to send those to the attacker. Cards typed into a hosted payment frame, such as Stripe’s or Adyen’s, were out of its reach. Cards typed into the site’s own fields were not.
  • Cookies and a screenshot. When it swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it could send the page address, cookies not marked HttpOnly, the original addresses, and a screenshot.
  • iPhones and iPads. The script could load a second stage Helme identifies as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, chosen by iOS version. He says the kit’s own comments treat iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched. He does not report a confirmed takeover of a phone. The Hacker News, citing the same research, says the same.

Helme’s timeline for November 16, in UTC, has the first Optimizely injection on a BBC snippet at 04:21, the card skimmer at 13:43, a sweep at 19:24 that found 186 infected snippets, and a cleanup that by 21:52 left one of 188 snippets still infected. He names that remaining one as TalkTalk. He also describes an earlier wave, from about November 13, that used other marketing scripts, including Kissmetrics. Those other companies have not, in the sources here, published their own account of that wave.

Money he could see

As of 19:25 UTC on November 16, Helme writes, the attacker’s wallets had received about $7,040, all of it within about nine hours that day. He breaks that into bitcoin, litecoin, TRON, ether and a small amount of a dollar-pegged token, and says some of it was swept to an exchange deposit address around 13:03 UTC. He cannot see how many card numbers or cookies arrived. StepSecurity’s update on November 17 says the bitcoin, litecoin and ether addresses in the script had been emptied that day. That is a movement of funds he had already counted, not a new total.

What you can do

  1. If you run Optimizely Web, read Optimizely’s notice and check Project JavaScript on every project, including experiments, for code you did not write. Blocking the attacker’s domain is not enough if a copy of the payload was pasted into the project. Ask Optimizely which projects were changed, when, and by which account, and remove users or tokens you do not recognize.
  2. If people typed a card into your own form on November 16, treat that number as exposed. A card entered in a Stripe or Adyen frame was outside this script, on Helme’s analysis. Watch for fraud either way, and follow your card network’s process.
  3. If you visited one of these sites on November 16 and copied a wallet address, check the address you pasted before you send funds. Helme’s figure is about $7,040 received, not a measure of how many people tried.
  4. On an iPhone or iPad, install the current iOS update. Helme says the kits he names treat 18.7.3 and 26.3, and later, as patched. Updating is the step. There is no confirmed case, in these reports, of a phone being taken over.
  5. A refund email that mentions this incident is not Optimizely, and it is not the website you visited. Do not send a card number to “verify” that you were affected.

How Frame helps

Frame can also look up your verified emails in Have I Been Pwned’s breach database. This report is about a script on other companies’ websites, not a new list of addresses. Frame doesn’t scan those sites, and it never collects or stores card numbers.

Related coverage

  • Fandango says a checkout skimmer copied card numbers for four days in October: a different company, and a skimmer on its own checkout rather than a shared experimentation script.
  • Polymarket traders lost funds after a website monitoring script was hijacked: an earlier case of a third-party script on a site people already trusted.

Sources

  • Scott Helme, Report URI, World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely, November 16, 2026
  • Optimizely, Web Experimentation Security Incident, November 17, 2026
  • Gizmodo, Sprawling Malware Attack Reportedly Affects Zoom and Other Major Brands, November 16, 2026
  • StepSecurity, OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Loaded a Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer on 178 Organizations, updated November 17, 2026
  • BleepingComputer, Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware, November 16, 2026
  • The Hacker News, Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors, November 17, 2026
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