Skip to content
FrameFrame home
PlatformBreach CheckFrame agentExtensionPrivacyBusinessPricing
Sign inSample report
FrameFrame home

Your digital life. Back in your hands.

100% Canadian-owned · Support: support@frameprivacy.com

Product

  • Platform
  • Sample report
  • Breach Check
  • Frame agent
  • Extension
  • Mobile app
  • Pricing
  • Frame Business
  • Changelog

Resources

  • Blog
  • Help centre
  • Free leak test
  • Status
  • Data-broker catalog
  • RSS feed

Company

  • About
  • Our privacy promise
  • Contact
  • Press and brand

Legal

  • Legal hub
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms
  • Security
  • Cookies
  • Accessibility

© 2026 Frame Labs Inc. All rights reserved.

en Englishfr Français
Your Privacy ChoicesSystem status

All posts

Scams · 4 min read

Calendar invites were used to steal live Google sessions, second factor included

Material Security says a campaign since August sent dull calendar invites, then proxied Google’s real sign-in so the session was captured. The themes have since shifted to Drive shares.

BBy Brody · FramePublished November 13, 2026
The Google logo on a light card, joined by a dotted arrow to an orange tile with a calendar icon, on a dark background.

A meeting invite that looks boring, and whose link starts on Google, can still be the way someone takes over the account. The Hacker News reported on November 12, 2026 on research from Material Security. The company calls its effort to disrupt the infrastructure Operation CloudFire. The phishing itself has been running since mid-August.

What the invites did

The messages arrived as Google Calendar invites. Some were sent by blind copy. Many came from an organization the recipient had already emailed, because the sender accounts were real ones the attacker already controlled, writing to people in those address books. The pretexts were ordinary: a voicemail, a request for proposal, a court summons, a missed payment.

Most links pointed at Google. The usual pattern used Google’s own redirect, with the real destination in a parameter. Other waves used share.google or Drive file links. One variant used Intuit transaction notices. When a filter scored the message, the domain, the certificate and the reputation it could see were legitimate.

After the click, Material says, the attacker ran a live proxy in front of Google’s real sign-in page. The person typed a password, got a genuine prompt, and approved it while the operator watched. The proxy passed the second factor through to Google as it arrived: a text code, an authenticator code, the number-matching prompt, or phone recovery. Those checks still ran. They did not stop the session from being copied. Material says the tool behind this, Nyasher, has been described publicly since February.

There was no fixed webpage for a scanner to fetch. After a challenge, JavaScript built the sign-in page in the browser. Early lure domains were registered days before they were used. Blocking one of them cost the operator little.

What Material counted, and where it stands

The numbers cover only organizations that agreed to share data, so the real totals are higher. Over one month of Operation CloudFire, Material recorded 68,676 campaign messages blocked, 2,112 malicious URLs, 897 domains taken down, and 8,570 compromised sender addresses across 6,354 root domains. Sends followed U.S. business hours. Material reported the gateways to Cloudflare, which put a warning in front of destinations it confirmed.

A copied session can read mail and Drive and can grant other apps access in that person’s name. The trace is in Google Workspace audit logs.

The Hacker News, citing the researchers, says the lures have moved from calendar invites to Drive file shares, and that this group’s activity looks scattered for now. Material also found an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch in the same code. Those paths did not resolve when the researchers looked. They expect the next round to look similar, with a different brand on it.

What you can do

  1. Treat a calendar invite you were not expecting the way you treat an unexpected email. Open the event from calendar.google.com or the Calendar app you already use, not from the link in the message, if anything about it asks you to sign in again.
  2. A real Google address at the start of a link is not proof the rest is Google. If a sign-in page appears after an invite, close it and sign in from a bookmark.
  3. If you approved a prompt you did not mean to, sign that Google account out of other sessions, remove apps you do not recognize, and change the password from a page you opened yourself. A password change does not necessarily end every session.
  4. Work accounts: someone has to read the Workspace sign-in logs. Material’s question for teams is whether they can revoke a session within an hour. That is an internal job, not something a personal user can do for a company tenant.

How Frame helps

Frame can also look up your verified emails in Have I Been Pwned’s breach database. This campaign steals a live session, not a published list of addresses. Frame doesn’t sign in to Google for you.

Related coverage

  • How scammers use leaked data to make phishing personal, and how to spot it: why a message from a name you know can still be someone else.
  • Lock down your Google and Apple accounts: passkeys, recovery and sessions: the settings that limit what a stolen session can do next.

Sources

  • The Hacker News, Calendar Invites and Live Proxies: Inside a Google Session Hijacking Campaign, November 12, 2026, reporting Material Security
  • Material Security, Reputation Says It's Fine: How Calendar Invites and a Live MFA Proxy Steal Google Sessions
  • Scams
  • Guides
More in Scams

More stories

  • ScamsOne phishing kit has been posing as 29 different banks since SeptemberNovember 17, 2026 · 4 min read
  • ScamsFake Microsoft 365 notices told people their held mail would be deletedNovember 16, 2026 · 3 min read
  • ScamsThe FBI says fake video meetings recorded people, then offered a malicious fixNovember 14, 2026 · 3 min read

New posts, by email.

About once a month. Plain-language privacy notes, nothing else. I never share your address.

Sent by Frame · privacy@frameprivacy.com · Privacy Policy

See what’s exposed about you.

Frame is in private beta. See what it finds, and how it helps you take it down, in a sample report built from made-up data.

See a sample exposure report
FrameFrame home
PlatformBreach CheckFrame agentExtensionPrivacyBusinessPricing
Sign inSample report

See what’s exposed about you.

Frame is in private beta. See what it finds, and how it helps you take it down, in a sample report built from made-up data.

See a sample exposure report