Research · 4 min read
Researchers showed a hostile host can read data inside AMD confidential VMs
Mior and Skyfall let a hostile host read data inside SEV-SNP virtual machines. AMD has firmware fixes. People who rent these machines depend on their provider to install them.

If you rent a “confidential” virtual machine in the hope that even the company running the server cannot read it, two attacks are worth a calm look. AMD published the Mior bulletin on November 10, 2026. The Hacker News reported Mior and a second attack, Skyfall, on November 13. Both attacks need a hostile host. They do not reach a machine across the internet by themselves. They matter where the threat you were trying to shut out is the operator of the server.
What the researchers showed
AMD’s SEV-SNP feature is meant to encrypt a virtual machine’s memory and keep the host’s hypervisor out of it. The two attacks read data inside machines protected that way. Researchers demonstrated them in lab tests on AMD EPYC server processors.
Mior, from a team at ETH Zurich, can also change a virtual machine’s memory and produce an attestation report that describes a different, harmless software image. Attestation is the signed statement a customer uses to check which software the machine is running. The attack needs control of the hypervisor and of the BIOS, plus a PCIe device such as a graphics card. The researchers say this sits inside the threat model AMD itself states for SEV-SNP, which does not trust the host firmware. They also say an ordinary virtual machine, which already trusts its host, gains nothing new from Mior: that machine was never promised this protection.
AMD’s bulletin AMD-SB-3059, first published November 10, tracks Mior as CVE-2026-0462 and scores it 5.9. A malicious hypervisor may redirect memory-mapped I/O in a way that can break the integrity of a SEV-SNP guest. AMD lists SEV-SNP as affected, not the older SEV and SEV-ES modes. The acknowledged reporters are Chris Wech, Philipp Giersfeld, Benedict Schlüter and Shweta Shinde of ETH Zurich.
Skyfall, from a team at ETH Zurich and Google, needs a malicious hypervisor and does not require tampering with the hardware. The Hacker News, citing AMD’s second advisory, says the virtual-machine leak is CVE-2026-40671, scored 4.9, and that it exposes register data from the guest. In the lab, the team recovered saved register values and, from a test virtual machine, a disk-encryption key. The Hacker News also notes that the program committee of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, which accepted the paper, said the write-up overlooks what a realistic attack would need, including a quiet processor core and a guest that does not crash while the attack runs. That caveat belongs next to the result.
Neither advisory, as reported, says the flaws have been used in attacks outside the labs.
Who has to install the fix
AMD’s Mior bulletin says SEV firmware dated August 12, 2026 is available (version 1.3A.03 for EPYC 7003, 1.3A.4 for 8004 and 9004, and 1.3A.0A for 8005 and 9005). Platform-initialization firmware for server makers is targeted for December 2026: MilanPI-SP3_1.0.0.L, GenoaPI_1.0.0.K and TurinPI_1.0.0.C, depending on the processor line. Embedded EPYC parts are targeted for February 2027. AMD tells customers to get the BIOS update from the company that built the server. The bulletin lists no workaround.
The Hacker News reports that Skyfall’s platform firmware is targeted for November, and that customers who rent these machines depend on the cloud provider to install host firmware. A renter cannot patch the host. The Mior bulletin also lists attestation values beside each fixed firmware version. It does not explain how a virtual-machine owner should check them.
What you can do
- If you run your own EPYC servers and use SEV-SNP, ask the server maker for the BIOS that contains AMD’s fixes, and don’t treat the August SEV firmware as the whole job until the platform firmware is in place.
- If you rent a confidential virtual machine, ask the provider whether the hosts you land on include these fixes. Until they do, the promise that the host cannot read the machine is the thing under test.
- If your virtual machine is ordinary, and you already assume the host can see it, Mior does not change that assumption. Skyfall is specifically about the confidential-computing boundary.
How Frame helps
Frame can also look up your verified emails in Have I Been Pwned’s breach database. This research is about server hardware, not a list of personal accounts. Frame doesn’t inspect cloud hosts.
Sources
- AMD, AMD-SB-3059: AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Vulnerability, initial version November 10, 2026
- The Hacker News, New Mior and Skyfall Attacks Let Rogue Cloud Hosts Steal Secrets From AMD SEV-SNP VMs, November 13, 2026
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